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Abstract - The ongoing evolution of the electric power
systems brings about the need to cope with increasingly com-
plex interactions of technical components and relevant ac-
tors. In order to integrate a more comprehensive spectrum
of different aspects into a probabilistic reliability assessment
and to include time-dependent effects, this paper proposes
an object-oriented hybrid approach combining agent-based
modeling techniques with classical methods such as Monte
Carlo simulation. Objects represent both technical compo-
nents such as generators and transmission lines and non-
technical components such as grid operators. The approach
allows the calculation of conventional reliability indices and
the estimation of blackout frequencies. Furthermore, the in-
fluence of the time needed to remove line overloads on the
overall system reliability can be assessed. The applicability
of the approach is demonstrated by performing simulations
on the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 and on a model of
the Swiss high-voltage grid.
Keywords - Reliability analysis, Monte Carlo simula-
tion, blackout frequency distribution, operator response
time
1 Introduction
THE ongoing evolution of the electric power systemsdue to market liberalization and the integration of
distributed generation is leading to increasingly complex
and hard-to-predict interactions of technical components,
relevant actors and the operating environments. Further-
more, recent large-area blackouts in North America and
Europe demonstrated the potential consequences of inad-
equate operator response times to contingencies (e.g. [1]).
In recent years several advanced methods have been de-
veloped to assess the reliability of electric power systems
in general and to model and analyze cascading blackouts
(e.g. [2, 3]). However, these approaches do not explicitly
simulate the evolution of the events in time and represent
the operator intervention to contingencies by using highly
simplified models not taking into account the time needed
for the corrective action. While Anghel et al. [4] introduce
a time-dependent probabilistic approach incorporating a
model for the utility response to line overloads, the influ-
ence of the response time on the occurrence of cascading
line outages remains neglected.
The contribution of this paper is to present a basic
modeling framework which allows the explicit integra-
tion of highly nonlinear, time-dependent effects and non-
technical factors into a probabilistic reliability assessment.
Therefore, we apply an object-oriented hybrid approach
combining agent-based modeling techniques [5] with clas-
sical methods such as Monte Carlo simulation [6]. Ob-
jects represent both technical components such as genera-
tors and transmission lines and non-technical components
such as grid operators. They interact with each other di-
rectly (e.g. via the generator dispatch) or via the physical
power flows on the network. By means of long-term simu-
lations the statistical data is gathered for the calculation of
system reliability indices and for the estimation of black-
out frequencies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the conceptual basics of the modeling framework
and the derivation of the different component models. In
section 3 we present the results of applying the model to
the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 and to the Swiss
high-voltage system. Section 4 concludes.
2 Modeling Framework
2.1 Conceptual Basics
The conceptual modeling framework consists in the
abstraction of the relevant technical and non-technical
components of the electric power system as individual in-
teracting objects. Each object is modeled by attributes and
rules of behavior. An example for an attribute is a techni-
cal component constraint such as the rating of a transmis-
sion line. The rules of behavior are represented by us-
ing finite state machines (FSM) and include both deter-
ministic and stochastic time-dependent, discrete events. A
deterministic event is, for instance, the outage of a com-
ponent when reaching a failure threshold, while stochas-
tic processes are probabilistic component failure models
using Monte Carlo techniques. The integration of non-
technical components is demonstrated by modeling the
behavior of the grid operators in case of line overloads.
For the corresponding interactions between the operators
and the technical components we make use of agent-based
modeling techniques. Furthermore, we account for the
possible division of the power system into several control
areas. To each control area a distinct grid operator and a
distinct control object are assigned. The control object is
not an abstraction of a technical component as such but
rather represents an implementation construct which con-
trols the balance between generation and load within the
corresponding control area. The model captures the sys-
tem behavior over an operational period of one year.
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2.2 Component Models
The components of the power system as being mod-
eled as objects are nL loads, nG generators, nT transmis-
sion lines, nB busbars and nK grid operators.
2.2.1 Loads
The power demand trajectory Di(t) of load i is de-
scribed by:
Di(t) = γ(t)D
max
i (1 + ρ(t))−∆Di(t) (1)
The demand factor γ(t) is the actual time-dependent per-
centage of the peak demand Dmaxi and follows a chrono-
logically changing load profile over the predefined time
period of one year. The percent deviation ρ(t) represents
stochastic demand fluctuations and is sampled hourly as-
suming a normal distribution with ρ(t) ∼ N(0, σ2) and
standard deviation σ = 0.0192 according to [7]. The
value of ρ(t) is assumed to be equal for all loads within
the same control area. The term ∆Di(t) represents the
actual amount of partially shed load.
Figure 1 shows the FSM as implemented for the load
objects. With the exception of the restoration process all
the transitions of the four-state model are externally gov-
erned by the control object k of the corresponding control
area.
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Figure 1: Finite state machine for the load objects
Partial load shedding occurs only when the control ob-
ject sheds load due to an operator action for removing a
line overload. As soon as the transmission system can be
operated within its security margins again, the load ob-
ject receives the signal to cancel the partial load shedding.
The load gets totally disconnected if there is not enough
generation capacity available within the entire system to
cover its demand or as a consequence of system splitting
(see section 2.3). If several loads have to be disconnected
within one control area all loads are given the same prior-
ity to be shed and are therefore selected randomly.
The restoration process is started once enough gener-
ation capacity is available again to cover the disconnected
demand, and is modeled by a queue technique. The load
which has been disconnected first is also restored first, the
subsequent one waits until the previous is reconnected.
Based on [8] we assume an incremental overall restoration
rate ν(∆tmtot) for four different restoration stages accord-
ing to table 1, where ∆tmtot is the elapsed time measured
from the start of the overall restoration process m. Hence,
the time needed to reconnect a specific load, ∆tmi , is de-
pendent on the actual overall restoration stage.
∆tmtot [min] ν(t) [MW/min]
0-30 10.0
30-60 33.3
60-90 66.6
> 90 83.3
Table 1: Stages of the overall restoration process and corresponding load
restoration rates, adopted from [8]
2.2.2 Generators
The commitment of the generating units is continu-
ously governed by the control object in order to cover the
actual demand Dk(t) =
∑
i∈Ωk Di(t) within the respec-
tive control area k. Being constrained by the maximum
power outputs Pmaxj , the commitment and economic dis-
patch follows a heuristic priority list method according to
[9] and is implemented in the control object. By using a
recursive algorithm and starting with the highest priority,
Dk(t) is equally distributed among the units with the same
priority. As their maximum capacity is reached the algo-
rithm proceeds to the next lower priority and so forth. In
case Dk(t) is larger than the available generation capac-
ity within a control area, the control object analogously
commits available generating units from the other control
areas of the system. As a simplification, ramp rates and
maintenance are not considered at this stage of our work.
The FSM for the generator object is made up of a two-
state model for repairable forced failures being treated as
random events as shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Finite state machine for the generator objects
The repairable forced failures are modeled by an inde-
pendent stochastic up-down-up cycle assuming stationar-
ity and constant failure and repair rates λj = 1/MTTFj
and µj = 1/MTTRj respectively. Hence, this alternat-
ing renewable process is characterized by the cumulative
distribution functions of the failure-free times τj and re-
pair times τ
′
j respectively, and by the probability pj that
the generating unit is in upstate at t = 0 [10]:
Fj(tu) = Pr{τj ≤ tu} = 1− e−λjtu (2)
Gj(tu) = Pr{τ ′j ≤ td} = 1− e−µjtd (3)
pj =
µj
λj + µj
(4)
where tu and td are the time spans measured from the
moment of entering the upstate and forced down state re-
spectively. All state transitions are reported to the control
object of the corresponding control area.
2.2.3 Transmission lines
The time variant line flows are calculated
by the DC power flow approximation with
P`(t) = x
−1
ab
(
θa(t)− θb(t)
)
, where P`(t) is the active
power flow on line ` connecting busbar a with busbar b,
having reactance xab and phase angles θa(t) and θb(t).
The approximate solution of the power flow problem does
not allow to analyze voltage disturbances. Nevertheless,
we assume the DC model to be appropriate for analyzing
cascading events due to line overloads and for showing
the feasibility of the proposed modeling concept.
A five-state model for the basic behavior of the trans-
mission line is used considering outages triggered by its
protection device and by independent random failures, see
figure 3. Thereby, the protection device is modeled by a
separate FSM.
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Figure 3: Finite state machine for the transmission line objects
In our model the protection device has two functions.
Firstly, it continuously measures the power flow P`(t) and
sends an alarm message (”overload”) to the operator of
the control area if P`(t) becomes equal to or larger than
the line rating Pmax` . Secondly, if P`(t) reaches P
out
` it
disconnects the line. However, as a consequence of the
stochastic time-dependent system behavior or the inter-
vention of the operator, P`(t) may again fall back to less
than Pmax` before reaching P
out
` and the protection de-
vice returns to the idle state. By following the assump-
tions made by Zima and Andersson [11] the probability
for the line outage increases linearly with the power flow,
being zero below Pmax` . Thus, we assume P
out
` being
uniformly distributed in the interval [Pmax` , βP
max
` ] with
β=1.4. The line is either reconnected if the phase angle
difference θ`(t) = θa(t)− θb(t) becomes smaller than the
preset value θmax` = ηxabP
max
` or after a time delay of
∆te` which models the time until a manual attempt to re-
close the breakers. The parameter η is used to avoid an
immediate recurrence of the overload, potentially result-
ing in a persistently repeating state change cycle, and is
set to η=0.9. Analogous to the probabilistic failure model
of the generating units (equations (2-4)), the time to per-
manent outage and the time to repair follow an exponential
distribution with failure rate λ` and µ` respectively.
2.2.4 Busbars
Every busbar object continuously calculates its phase
angle θa(t) relative to its neighboring busbars:
θa(t) =
P tota (t) +
∑
b∈Ωa
(
x−1ab θb(t)
)
∑
b∈Ωa
x−1ab
(5)
where P tota (t) =
∑
j∈a Pj(t) −
∑
i∈aDi(t) is the net
power injection at busbar a, to which several loads and
generating units might be connected. This distributed ap-
proach allows avoiding time consuming matrix calcula-
tions in case of network decompositions and restorations
due to line outages and reconnections. Potential random
outages of busbars are not considered.
2.2.5 Grid operator
The grid operator becomes active in case of trans-
mission line overload contingencies, trying to remove the
overload by redispatching the generators or by shedding
load if necessary. The basic model for the operator be-
havior is illustrated for the overload of a tie-line between
two control areas, see figure 4. If a tie-line becomes over-
loaded the protection device sends an alarm message to
the two operators of both control areas (compare figure 3).
Having the alarm received the neighboring operators try
to contact each other with a time delay ∆tcd. The opera-
tor which has been assigned responsible for the line then
needs some time to find a solution to the overload prob-
lem, which is modeled by a time delay ∆trd.
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Figure 4: Finite state machine for the grid operator
The corrective action to remove the overload is subse-
quently formulated as a conventional optimal power flow
(OPF) problem [9] and implemented within the control
object by using the linear programming (LP) method min-
imizing potential load shedding, ∆Di, and the change
in generation, ∆Pj , subject to the transmission line con-
straints and the power balance:
min z =
nB∑
a=1
(
ωa
(∑
j∈a
|∆Pj |+W
∑
i∈a
∆Di
))
(6)
subject to
nG∑
j=1
∆Pj = −
nL∑
i=1
∆Di (7)
− Pj(t) ≤ ∆Pj ≤ Pmaxj − Pj(t) (8)
0 ≤ ∆Di ≤ Di(t) (9)∣∣∣∣P`(t) + nB∑
a=1
(
a`a(t)
(∑
j∈a
∆Pj +
∑
i∈a
∆Di
))∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξPmax`
(10)
where ωa is the busbar specific distance weighting factor
and set to ωa=1 for the two busbars at each end of the over-
loaded line, ωa=10 for the busbars being one line further
away and ωa=100 for all other busbars within the overall
system. The weighting factor W=10000 lets partial load
shedding be more expensive relative to the generator re-
dispatch. The linear line sensitivity factor a`a(t) =
dP`
dP tota
with respect to busbar a is dependent on the network con-
nectivity at the model time t and is calculated using the
conventional matrix method as described in [9]. Equation
(10) holds for all lines within the two neighboring con-
trol areas. Similar to the model for the reconnection of a
failed line, the parameter ξ is used to delay the potential
recurrence of an overload and set to ξ=0.8.
The procedure for line overloads within a single con-
trol area is basically the same, but without the interaction
of the operators and by restricting the load control vari-
ables ∆Di to the busbars and equation (10) to the trans-
mission lines within the control area. In order to prioritize
the generator redispatch within the control area concerned,
the distance weighting factor is set to ωa=1 for busbars in-
side and ωa=100 for busbars outside the control area.
2.3 System Splitting
The splitting of the network due to transmission line
outages usually leads to an imbalance between load and
generation within the separated subsystems. Further, de-
pending on the total inertia within the separated parts, on
the frequency control performance and the protection de-
vice behavior of the generators, and on implemented au-
tomatic load shedding procedures, this imbalance comes
along with a frequency deviation potentially leading to sta-
bility problems [12]. The consequences range from small
load losses to a total collapse of the subsystem (e.g., [1]).
In order to include load outages as a consequence of a net-
work splitting while avoiding a complicated model with a
high amount of parameters to be estimated we make use
of a highly simplified approach. Thereby, an excess of de-
mand within a separated subsystem leads to the immediate
disconnection of a minimum number of randomly selected
loads so that the excess is at least reduced to zero. An ex-
cess of generation leads to the immediate reduction of the
generator outputs in order to reestablish the balance and
implies no load outages. This strong simplification might
be inadequate to represent the real system behavior and
the amount of disconnected load thus has to be viewed as
a rather indicative value for the system vulnerability re-
garding the splitting of the network.
2.4 Blackout Frequency Distributions
By means of long-term simulations (i.e. repeatedly
over the operation period of one year) the necessary sta-
tistical data is gathered for the calculation of conventional
reliability indices such as the Expected Energy Not Sup-
plied (EENS). Moreover, frequency distributions of ex-
pected blackouts per year are derived. Therefore, let X be
a random variable counting the number of blackouts per
year greater than a specified size C. The size is thereby
classified by the unserved energy or the maximum amount
of demand not being supplied in the course of an event.
The expectation E(X) is approximated by generating N
realizations of X and calculating their empirical mean,
which represents the observed complementary cumulative
frequency of events related to one year, denoted by Fˆc(C):
E(X) ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Xi ≡ Fˆc(C) (11)
where N denotes the number of simulated years.
Assuming that X follows a Poisson distribution, the
confidence interval for E(X) can be constructed by using
the central Chi-square distribution [13]:
γ = 1−α = Pr
[
1
2N
χ2f∗;α/2 ≤ E(X) ≤
1
2N
χ2f ;1−α/2
]
(12)
where γ is the confidence level, α is the probability of er-
ror, and f∗ = 2
∑N
i=1Xi and f = 2(
∑N
i=1Xi + 1) are
the degrees of freedom. The blackout events can further
be classified into the three outage causes as implemented
in the model:
• Generation inadequacy:
Loads are disconnected as not enough generation
capacity is available to cover the actual demand
within the overall system or within a previously sep-
arated subsystem.
• System splitting:
Loads are disconnected as a consequence of the sep-
aration of the system.
• Operator intervention:
Load is partially shed in order to remove transmis-
sion line overloads.
3 Case Studies
3.1 Application to the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996
3.1.1 System layout and model parameters
The three-area IEEE Reliability Test System 1996
(RTS-96) has 73 busbars, 120 transmission lines and 96
generating units [14]. We use the year-long load data with
an hourly resolution provided in [14] for modeling the de-
mand trajectories Di(t). The three areas have a base case
peak loadDmaxk,0 of 2850 MW each and are treated as three
single control areas with three corresponding control ob-
jects and grid operators. The priorities given to the differ-
ent generator types are shown in table 2.
Unit Type Pmaxj [MW] Priority
Hydro 50 1
Nuclear 400 2
Coal/Steam 350 3
Coal/Steam 155 4
Coal/Steam 76 5
Oil/Steam 197 6
Oil/Steam 100 7
Oil/Steam 12 8
Oil/CT 20 9
Table 2: Dispatch priorities for the generating units
The failure and repair rates for the generators and the
transmission lines are taken from [14]. The parameter
value for the time until the manual attempt to re-close the
breaker of a disconnected line is assumed to be ∆te`=1h.
Regarding the operator model ∆tcd is set to 2min.
3.1.2 Computational results
The results of two parameter variation studies are pre-
sented and discussed: 1) the sensitivity of the blackout
frequency to an increase of the system loading without
any operator intervention and 2) the influence of the oper-
ator response time on the Expected Energy Not Supplied
(EENS). Concerning the first experiment we increment the
system loading level L = Dmaxk /D
max
k,0 . The maximum
generator outputs, Pmaxj , are augmented by the same fac-
tor. In order to gain statistically significant results (i.e.
N≈1000) about 50 hours of simulation time are needed
on a single desktop computer (Dell Optiplex GX260 with
a Pentium 4 CPU of 2.66GHz and 512MB of RAM). This
time was considerably reduced by running several simu-
lations in parallel. Figure 5 shows the resulting comple-
mentary cumulative blackout frequencies with respect to
the unserved energy per event, Fˆc(CE), for four differ-
ent values of L. Regarding the two lower system loading
levels (L=1.0 andL=1.1) the observed complementary cu-
mulative frequencies follow approximately an exponential
curve. However, increasing L to 1.2 already leads to a re-
markable increase of large events, while the shape of the
curve in the range of the smaller events (up to about 103
MWh) stays qualitatively the same. The value of L=1.37
represents the maximum system loading level where no
line overloads would occur without any stochastic compo-
nent outages. This loading level can be characterized by
a high frequency of large blackouts predominantly in the
range between 104 MWh and 105 MWh.
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Figure 5: Complementary cumulative blackout frequencies for four dif-
ferent system loading levels L=1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.37 (circles, stars, tri-
angles and diamonds, respectively) without operator intervention. The
error bars indicate the 90% confidence interval.
In order to further analyze the differences between the
overall frequency curves the distributions of the underly-
ing power outage causes have to be considered. The log-
arithmic histograms of figure 6 report the impact of in-
creasing the system loading from L=1.0 to L=1.37 on the
absolute frequency of blackouts f(CE) caused by genera-
tion inadequacy (left hand side) and system splitting (right
hand side). System splitting is the predominant cause of
the observed blackouts for both loading levels. In compar-
ison to generation inadequacy the absolute frequencies for
this outage mode show a stronger increase and a stronger
shift towards larger events when it comes to an increase
of the system loading. Hence, the substantial increase of
large blackouts as shown in figure 5 is mainly the result of
an increased frequency of line overloads and subsequent
system splitting.
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Figure 6: Impact of increasing the system loading from L=1.0 (dashed
line) to L=1.37 (continuous line) on the absolute frequencies of black-
outs caused by generation inadequacy (left) and system splitting (right).
The results of our second parameter variation study are
presented in figure 7, showing the influence of the oper-
ator response time ∆trd on the EENS broken down into
the different outage causes for the system loading level
L=1.37. For the interpretation of the results it should be
reminded that thermal aspects of the line overloads are not
taken into consideration. Under our model assumptions
an operator intervention with a delay of 5 hours after the
occurence of the overload still reduces the EENS due to
system splitting by about 30%. On the other hand, an in-
crease of the response time from 15min to 30min leads to
a significant increase of the EENS due to system splitting
of about 26%. The EENS due to generation inadequacy
is increasing with the response time as the system is more
often separated which, in turn, reduces the redundancy of
the generators within the splitted subsystems. The values
for the EENS due to the operator intervention are negligi-
ble.
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Figure 7: Influence of the operator response time on the EENS due to
generation inadequacy (left, black bar), operator action (middle, dark-
grey bar) and system splitting (right, light-grey bar) for L=1.37.
3.2 Application to the Swiss High-Voltage Grid
3.2.1 System layout and model parameters
The Swiss electric power system consists of a sin-
gle control area with an annual energy consumption of
62.1 · 103 GWh and a peak load of about 10 GW. The
energy production and installed capacity total to 59.4 ·103
GWh and 12 GW respectively, consisting of 42.2% nu-
clear, 52.4% hydro and 5.4% conventional thermal gen-
eration [15]. The number of components as used in our
model for the 380/220 kV transmission grid are shown in
table 3.
nL nG nT nB nK
99 34 229 161 1
Table 3: Number of components of the Swiss system
Based on a particular system snapshot taken on a Jan-
uary morning the fluctuating power injections P tota (t) at
the different nodes are derived by using publicly available
statistical data [15]. For each hydro power generator a dif-
ferent production capacity is assigned for the winter half-
year and the summer half-year respectively. The failure
and repair rates for all hydro generators are equally set to
λj = 4.42y
−1 and µj = 0.05h−1, and for all nuclear
units to λj = 3y−1 and µj = 0.027h−1. Regarding the
transmission lines the failure model parameters are cho-
sen as λ` = 0.234y−1 and µ` = 0.056h−1. As the phase
shifting transformers have considerable influence on the
power flows corrective injections were calculated for the
nodes adjacent to a phase shifting transformer. The en-
ergy exchange with the neighboring countries is modeled
by independent positive or negative power injections at the
surrounding boundary nodes. The parameter values for the
time until the manual attempt to re-close the breaker of a
disconnected line and for the operator response time are
assumed to be ∆te`=1h and ∆t
r
d=15min, respectively.
3.2.2 Computational results
It should be noted that the intention of the analysis was
primarily to investigate the applicability of the proposed
modeling method to a real system. The computational re-
sults thus make no claim to quantify the reliability of the
Swiss high-voltage grid in absolute terms.
The estimated blackout frequencies and the histogram
of the different outage causes both with respect to the
unserved energy per event are depicted in figure 8. The
model potentially overestimates the duration of the events
and thus the unserved energy as switching operations on
lower voltage levels for the reconnection of deenergized
loads and the possibility to import extra power from neigh-
boring countries to overcome generation shortages are not
taken into consideration.
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Figure 8: Left: estimated blackout frequencies for the Swiss system
with respect to the unserved energy. The error bars indicate the 90%
confidence interval. Right: histogram indicating the distribution of the
outages due to generation inadequacy (continuous line), system splitting
(dotted line) and load shedding for line overload removal (dashed line).
The complementary cumulative blackout frequency
follows an exponential curve. Generation inadequacy is
the dominant factor regarding the larger events while load
shedding for line overload relief becomes important in the
range of the smaller events. The influence of load discon-
nections due to system splitting is significant but the fre-
quency of this outage cause never exceeds the frequency
of load disconnections due to generation inadequacy or
load shedding due to the operator action. Hence, under
our model assumptions, it can be concluded that the sys-
tem reliability is somewhat more sensitive to generation
outages than to transmission line failures.
The benefit of the operator response to line overloads
is shown in figure 9 where the frequencies of the events
with and without operator action are compared. The event
size is thereby measured by the maximum unserved de-
mand.
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Figure 9: Blackout prevention due to operator response to line over-
loads. Triangles: no operator intervention, circles: operator intervention
with ∆trd = 15min. The error bars indicate the 90% confidence interval.
The impact of the operator intervention becomes sig-
nificant in the range of the larger events where a high
fraction of blackouts with a size greater than 200 MW
is prevented. A large number of disconnected loads due
to system splitting and thus a high value for the unserved
demand generally needs a high number of subsequently
disconnected lines due to overload. Such a sequence of
events potentially gives the operator a higher chance to in-
tervene in comparison to a disconnection of a single load
due to the outage of a few lines without further cascading
failures.
The relative overload frequencies for each transmis-
sion line, h`, are reported in figure 10. About 15% of all
overload contingencies are occurring on only two lines.
Furthermore, several groups of adjacent lines can be iden-
tified as being prone to overloads, helping to highlight the
most critical system regions.
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Figure 10: Relative frequency of transmission line overloads (N=2242)
4 Conclusions
We presented an object-oriented hybrid modeling
framework for a comprehensive reliability analysis of
electric power systems. The main advantages are the ex-
plicit integration of highly nonlinear, time-dependent ef-
fects and the possibility to include non-technical factors.
The chosen level of modeling detail allows analyzing a
multitude of different (time-dependent) reliability aspects
such as the identification of weak points and the assess-
ment of system upgrades. Although several model refine-
ments need to be further developed, the results of the case
studies performed on the IEEE RTS-96 and on a model
of the Swiss high-voltage grid confirm the applicability
of the approach with respect to mid-period power sys-
tem planning purposes. Optimizing the technical imple-
mentation of the models [16] together with the evolution
of both hard- and software will fasten up the simulation
speed. Gaining experience in applying the proposed ap-
proach will give insight in the parameters to be used, thus
lessen the problem of the high number of parameters to be
estimated.
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